An Improved Energy Efficient Intrusion Detection System for False Misbehavior Elimination in Wireless Sensor Networks

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Abstract: - A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of many sensor nodes with low cost and power capability. The nature of WSN makes it easily prone to security attacks and paves way for attackers to easily eavesdrop the network. One of the deadliest attack is the Sink Hole attack where the destruction caused to the network becomes inexplicable. It causes the intruder to lure all the packets and drop it, that ultimately will disrupt the sensor networks functionalities. The existing Watchdog mechanism consumes more energy to compute the sink hole node in the network and its trustworthiness also becomes debatable. In this paper, a novel algorithm is developed to improve the existing Watchdog monitoring system for Intrusion Detection to detect the false misbehaving node and elimination of the same. The simulation results show that precise elimination of the malicious node is done. Moreover, a greater percentage reduction in energy consumption is achieved by the proposed method that makes this system more viable for WSN.


1 Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a specialized wireless network that is composed of a number of sensor nodes deployed in a specified area for monitoring environment conditions such as temperature, air pressure, humidity, light, motion or vibration, and can communicate with each other using a wireless radio device. WSNs are powerful in that they are amenable to support a lot of very different real-world applications; they are also a challenging research and engineering problem because of this very flexibility. Most sensor network protocols assume a high degree of trust between nodes in order to eliminate the overhead of authentication. This creates the risk of attackers introducing malicious nodes to the network, or manipulating the operation of existing nodes. Consequently, there is the potential for a wide variety of attacks on sensor networks. An intrusion is defined as a set of actions that compromises confidentiality, availability, and integrity of a system. Intrusion detection is a security technology that attempts to identify those who are trying to break into and misuse a system without authorization and those who have legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges. The system can be a host computer, network equipment, a firewall, a router, a corporate network, or any information system being monitored by an intrusion detection system.

The nodes in WSN are deployed in open air and so they are subjected to a variety of security threats and attacks. Trust mechanism has been developed to defend against insider attacks \cite{11, 12, 15}. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Sinkhole, HELLO Flood, Sybil attack, Selective forwarding, Acknowledgement spoofing, Altering or replaying or spoofing routing information are some of the attacks that the nodes are subjected to. The attacks \cite{7} are classified into Active attacks and Passive attacks. The deadliest of the attacks is the Sink hole attack where its goal of the adversary is to lure all the traffic from a particular area. One motivation for mounting a Sinkhole attack is that it makes selective forwarding trivial. By ensuring that all traffic in the targeted area flows through a compromised node, an adversary can selectively suppress or modify packets originating from any node in the area. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the Watchdog Monitoring systems. Section 3 discusses the related research that has gone into attacks and its detection. The proposed work is dealt in Section 4 followed by the simulation results in Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Watchdog Monitoring System

Normal Watchdog is a kind of behaviour monitoring mechanism which is the base of many trust systems in ad hoc and wireless sensor networks. In general, trust mechanism works in the following three stages 1) node behaviour monitoring, 2) trust measurement, and 3) insider attack detection. Watchdog [6] is a popular monitoring mechanism for node behaviour monitoring. The basic idea of Watchdog is a node monitors whether its next-hop neighbour forwards the packets it just sent by overhearing. If the packet is not forwarded within a certain period, the neighbour is regarded as misbehaving in this transaction. The overhearing ability [8][1] is shown in Fig.1.

![Fig.1 Overhearing Ability of Nodes in a Network](image1)

It is achieved by the use of omnidirectional antennas. The advantage of using omnidirectional antennas is that, when a node sends a packet, all its neighbors can hear the node sending the packet. The identity of the node can be verified using existing cryptographic techniques. Such a technique can be used to verify whether or not a link exists between two nodes. In order for a node to verify whether a link exists between two nodes, it must be within the communication range of both the nodes. In this approach, each sensor node has its own watchdog that monitors and records its one hop neighbors’ behaviors such as packet transmission. When a sending node S sends a packet to its neighbor node T, the Watchdog in S verifies whether T forwards the packet toward the Base Station or not by using the sensor’s overhearing ability within its transceiver range. When a node sends a packet to its neighbor, it also caches one locally. Then the node listens to its neighbor’s communication. If the neighbor doesn’t forward the same packet to its next-hop node within a period, it is regarded as misbehaving. By this way, a node could record the successful and failed forwarding history of its next-hop.

2.1 Limitations of Watchdog Mechanism

Watchdog has some security vulnerabilities due to inherent weaknesses of WSNs such as distributed sensors, limited transceiver range, and multi-hop routing. Watchdog has the limitation [7] of not being able to detect a misbehaving node in the presence of the following cases. The cases are examined using the scenario as shown in Fig.2 using the path S – A – B – C.

![Fig. 2 Limitations of Watchdog Mechanism](image2)

1) Ambiguous Collision: Consider the situation that A forwards a packet to B, and then starts to overhear whether B will forward the packet to C. However, when B forwards to C, A may not overhear this transmission if other neighbors (such as S) send packets to A at the same time. This ambiguous collision may mislead A to conclude that B is malicious, which may not be correct.

2) Receiver Collision: Similar to the above case, collision may also occur at the receiver side C resulting C does not receive the packet correctly. A can only overhear that B has forwarded the packet, but A cannot tell whether C has received. When this happens, (malicious) node B can intentionally skip retransmissions or (malicious) node C can generate collision on purpose to avoid receiving the packet and to force B into retransmitting.

3) Limited Transmission Power: If B adjusts its transmission power such that A can overhear but C cannot receive, B can drop packets and increase its trustworthiness (to node A). In geographic routings where every node knows the positions of itself and its neighbors, B can easily launch this attack by selecting a node C from its FS such that dist (B, C) > dist (B, A) where dist (i, j) is a distance between node i and j.

4) False misbehavior: This case happens when a malicious node intentionally reports that other nodes are misbehaving. For example, A may report B is dropping packets although B is not. Then, A’s neighbor such as node S, who cannot directly communicate (and thus monitor) B, will consider B malicious.

5) Collusion: Multiple colluding attackers can launch more sophisticated attacks. For example, two malicious colluding node A and B can completely deceive S if A forwards all packets from S to B, but...
B drops all the packets. Because S cannot overhear B’s misbehaviors, S will not consider A and B malicious.

6) Partial dropping: Instead of dropping all packets, B can drop only some packets such that the failure tally will not exceed the detection threshold of A’s Watchdog. This is similar with grey hole attack.

3 Related Work
Recently, different techniques have been proposed for Watchdog monitoring system in Wireless Sensor Networks. A mechanism based on signal strength [5] was proposed to detect the malicious nodes in a network. The idea was to compare the signal strength of a reception with its expected value. A signal is only detected by a receiving node if the received signal power is equal or greater than the received signal power threshold. If the signal power received is less than the threshold then the particular node is suspected to be malicious. This may not be true for all cases. A signal power can be weakened due to various reasons like environmental factors, weak signal strength etc.

Youngho Cho et al [13] proposed an improved Watchdog monitoring system by adding a threshold mechanism. In this mechanism, the sending node stores all recently sent packets in its buffer, and compares each packet with the overheard packet to see whether there is a match. If yes, it means that the packet is forwarded by the neighboring node and the sender will remove the packet from the buffer. This methodology’s is that it requires sniffing enough data packets to decide whether a node is an attacker. This means that more time is needed to make a decision compared to a network without a tolerance threshold. If the attacker is moving, there is a possibility that the malicious node moves outside the Watchdog signal range, and thus it could not be detected.

Several works [14] that used neighbor-based approach have been introduced in order to mitigate selective forwarding attacks. Wang Xin-sheng et al in [10] used a monitoring neighbor that alarms the sending node and the Base Station when an insider attacks by dropping packets. The limitation of this method is when neighbor nodes falsely accuse good nodes of attackers. Moreover, it can also not address selective forward drops.

Bin Xiao et al [12] used a scheme for detecting selective forwarding attacks. Here, relative communication overhead in terms of number of compromised nodes seems to be higher. In [11], the authors Issa Khalil et al have proposed an algorithm Unmask for detection, diagnosis, and isolation of nodes launching control attacks, such as, wormhole, Sybil, rushing, sinkhole, and replay attacks. But, the limitation of the methodology lies in its difficulty using for mobile networks.

In [7], the authors have proposed a methodology of monitoring the neighbor by virtually extending the nodes’ monitoring coverage. The disadvantage of this method is that the selective packet drops are not addressed. Forootanini et al [1] have developed an improved Watchdog monitoring system based on a power aware hierarchical model. The methodology resolves the ambiguous Collision.

4 Proposed Work
Existing Watchdog mechanism has the limitation of not being able to detect the misbehaving nodes which upsets the routing of packets in the network. Our objective is to improvise the monitoring of malicious nodes that lead to efficient energy operation and accurate detection of malicious nodes. A novel detection algorithm is devised to detect the fake node that has been pinpointing others to be malicious. The proposed detection Algorithm is as follows:

**ALGORITHM 1**

Let the WSN has a collection of sensor nodes $N_0 – N_n$
The source sends data packets to nodes
1. for each intermediate node on a routing path from the Source to Sink
2. Sink verifies their sequential numbers
3. if Sink detects a discontinuous sequential number
4. Sink broadcasts an alert packet
5. end if
6. for each intermediate node receiving the alert
7. it verifies the packets within its cache
8. if it detects a missing packet
9. sends back an alert to Sink
10. else
11. sends back a normal response packet
12. end if
13. end for
14. if Sink receives a collection of response packet
15. if an intermediate node does not send back a response
16. Sink records the identity of that intermediate node
17. end if
18. Sink analyzes the status information of the nodes on the routing path
19. Sink finds out the malicious nodes
The sink broadcasts the identity of malicious nodes. Let it be assumed that the node responds with a 1 as its status bit for a negative packet and 0 for a positive packet. The node that does not respond has a status bit value to be -1. A suspicious set is generated that contain nodes having status bit as -1. They are not concluded as malicious nodes since the packets from nodes may not have been received by the sink due to interference and low communication quality. The sink gathers the status bit in subsequent packet transmissions. A suspicious point is set for the node which has the previous status bit as 0 or -1 and if there is a transition to 1 in subsequent data collection. Thus, the sensor node on the routing path where the value changes from 0 or -1 to 1 is referred as the suspicious point. The node identified as suspicious along with the upstream nodes and downstream nodes form the malicious sequence. Implementation of this concept in the existing Watchdog mechanism enhances the performance by eliminating the misbehaving node accurately without it becomes highly time consuming and energy inefficient.

**ALGORITHM 2**

Let $S_0$ – Source node; $S_i$, $S_{i+1}$……$S_n$ – Input node; $S_k$ – Sink node; $S_{mi}$ - Malicious node
1. for each $S_i$ watches $S_{i+1}$ whether data sent successfully or not
2. At the same time $S_0$ sends the data to the $S_i$
3. if $S_{i+1}$ is a true node
4. response bit of $S_i$ is zero
5. else
6. response bit of $S_i$ can send zero or one
7. end if
8. end for
9. When it reaches $S_n$ all the response bit will be send to the $S_k$
10. By fixing the suspicious point the exact $S_{mi}$ will be found out.

The property of the malicious node is that it can limit its transmission power and deceive the Watchdog. The proposed algorithm helps to exactly detect such misbehaving nodes. A simple case is taken to analyze the proposed algorithm to find the accuracy of detecting the malicious node and thereby eliminating the false misbehaviour limitation of Watchdog mechanism.

Fig. 3 depicts the scenario of a malicious node limiting its transmission power. The source node is $S$, the destination being $D$ and the others are the intermediate nodes. In the existing Watchdog mechanism, when $B$ limits its transmission power, it makes the Watchdog to believe that the packet has been sent. Actually, the packet gets dropped without the destination receiving it. As the Watchdog cannot overhear the receiver it assumes that the receiver has received the packet and declares the malicious node to be true node and in the process the true node $C$ is falsely declared as malicious when actually Node $B$ is. This false misbehaviour detection is eliminated in the proposed technique. In this technique, the responses from the Watchdog mechanism are considered as the response packets for the sink node. The packets are sent through the nodes in the network. A list of status bits for the nodes on the routing path after the sink receives all the response packets from them within a limited time cycle. The status for one round of response can be denoted by a vector $[b_1, b_2, ..., b_i]$, \{1, 0, -1\}. The sink can perform intrusion detection by analyzing the status vector. To any, $b_{i+1}$, $b_i \in B$, if $b_{i+1}=0$ or -1 and $b_i=1$, then $b_{i+1}$ is a change point in $B$. A change point is a sensor node on the routing path where the value of status bit turns from 0 or -1 to 1. If a node $S_i$ is a suspicious point and $S_{cd}$ is the nearest downstream node on the routing path, then the sequence $(S_c, S_{cd})$ contains a malicious node. The major goal of the proposed algorithm is to find those smallest malicious sequences on the routing path. The smallest malicious sequence always contains a suspicious point as well as the nearest downstream node of the suspicious point.
The smallest malicious sequence can be found by detecting the suspicious point as well as the nearest downstream node, which contains a malicious node. The implementation of the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 4. It shows the response bits of one round of the source node $S_0$ and the intermediate nodes $A$, $B$, $C$ being sent to the sink node $S_1$.

Tab. 1 Response Bits of Two Rounds of the Nodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Round 1</th>
<th>Round 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$S_0$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 1 shows the response bits of two rounds of the nodes in the network. By implementing the algorithm in the sink, the data collected by it fixes the suspicion point at Node $B$ and from the data of the downstream node it concludes exactly that Node $A$ is malicious. The limitations found in existence in Watchdog are eliminated using the proposed scheme. The sink after detecting the exact malicious node broadcasts its identity to the other nodes so that the malicious node is eliminated from the routing path.

5 Simulation Results and Discussion

It is assumed that the network setup is static, meaning that the location of the sensor nodes does not change. It is also assumed that the sensor nodes have the same transmitting power except the malicious node being able to change its transmission power. The classical radio energy model [1] is considered where the energy consumption of transmitter and the receiver for a bit is 50nJ.

Fig. 5 Scenario of the Wireless Sensor Network

Fig. 5 shows the simulation of the nodes in WSN using NS2. Here, a 10 node network is simulated and in this the source node is marked in red and the sink node in yellow.

Fig. 6 Transmission of Packets and Response Bits

Fig. 6 shows the transmission of packets and the response bits to the sink node. The intermediate nodes send the response bits to the sink node. The response bits are collected from the nodes in two rounds to ascertain the exact malicious node.
Once the response bits reach the sink, the algorithm is run in the sink node and a suspicion point is fixed. After careful fixing of the suspicion point node as discussed earlier, the malicious node is accurately determined and the node marked in yellow in Fig.7 is adjudged malicious.

The identification of malicious nodes in a network is shown in Fig.8 for both the existing Watchdog mechanism and the proposed algorithm. The graph is plotted for the number of rounds against the nodes. It is found that the existing Watchdog mechanism shows a different node in each round to be malicious and to determine the exact malicious node it takes more rounds and subsequently more energy is consumed in the process. The exact malicious node is identified only twice in the rounds conducted and even then existing mechanism is not unerring as it gives different nodes to be malicious at different times. The proposed algorithm is found to have identified the exact malicious node irrespective of the number of rounds conducted. All systems, processes and communication protocols for sensors and sensor networks must minimize power consumption. Fig.9 gives the comparison of energy consumed by the individual nodes in a network. It is seen that the proposed algorithm makes the nodes consumes lesser or equal energy when compared with the existing mechanism.

The average energy consumption of the network also seems to be low for the proposed algorithm as it is inferred from Fig. 10. The average energy consumed by the network is 43.5 nJ when the proposed algorithm is run and it is 75nJ in the existing methodology. This means that nearly 58% of energy is conserved by the proposed methodology for the network setup taken.

From both the graphs it is inferred that the overall energy consumption and the individual energy consumption are reduced by 58% using the proposed algorithm when compared with the existing Watchdog methodology.

6 Conclusion
Detection of malicious node is a major concern for security of any network. It is very essential to detect these nodes to prevent the network from loss or tampering of packets. This paper proposes a simple methodology to detect the exact malicious nodes in a Wireless Sensor Network. By using this methodology the exact
malicious nodes can be identified and excluded from the network. The energy consumption of the total network is also considerably reduced. The proposed technique implemented in the sink node eliminates the greatest limitation of the existing Watchdog mechanism, the false misbehaviour detection of malicious node. The experimental results also show that the proposed technique consumes lesser energy than the existing method. This reduction in energy by 58% for the network setup taken proves to be very significant for Wireless Sensor Network. This proposed mechanism becomes highly significant for a dense network consisting of more nodes where only limited power resources are utilized ensuring increase in the life time of the network.

References:


