Source Anonymization Using Modified New Variant ElGamal Signature Scheme

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Abstract: Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have distinct features: like dynamic nodes, changing topologies, nodes cooperation and open communication media. Anonymity of message contents and participants is the most concerned task in MANET communication. Most of the existing methods face a challenge due to heavy cryptographic computation with high communication overheads. In this paper we propose an unconditionally secure privacy preserving message authentication scheme (PPMAS), which uses Modified New variant ElGamal signature Scheme (MNES). This scheme enables a sender to transmit messages, providing authentication along with anonymity, without relying on any trusted third parties. It also allows the untraceability of the link between the identifier of a node and its location. The experimental analysis of the proposed system is presented.

Key-Words: Network security, Anonymity, Privacy, Mobile ad hoc networks, PPMAS, MNES.

1 Introduction

A set of mobile wireless devices having the capability of relaying packets for another in a cooperative manner is called as a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). The advantage of a MANET is that the disadvantages of wired networks and centralized administration issues are solved. The applications of MANET are manifold: battle ground communication, disaster recovery, conferencing and information sharing. The communication between the mobile nodes normally is performed through multi hop paths.

The main concern with the MANET is that the information about the nodes and their networks is to be made public. Many applications find this as a privacy threat. A node should be able to preserve its identity, its location and its network neighbours [8][17]. This privacy can be achieved using encryption.

The nodes in MANETs must be able to communicate messages in an authenticated manner securely. In addition to this the privacy of the node should be preserved making the node anonymous. Wireless MANETs are often found deployed where unfavorable conditions deter the deployment of a fixed wire network, where anonymity may be highly desirable for participating nodes. Consider a scenario in which members of an underground movement wish to share news about the crimes of an oppressive regime. Can an attacker detect who is producing the information and who is consuming it? Can an attacker ascertain other relationships between participating nodes and consequently punish them? Alternatively, consider a mobile combat unit operating inside enemy territory. Given that an enemy has set up a sensor network to eavesdrop on all communications, does the enemy know which node serves as a central leader or where forces are concentrated?

On account of quandaries such as these, anonymity in MANETs has become a subject of research in recent years, with several anonymization schemes...
proposed and analyzed. These include refurbished wired network schemes as well as specially tailored new ones. However, most existing schemes require use of heavy cryptography, pre-existing trust among nodes or dissemination of complete knowledge of network topology. These requirements are not aligned with typical MANET constraints, whereby nodes need to conserve energy, do not necessarily know each other in advance and may often move about, respectively. Moreover, adversaries encountered in wireless MANETs are quite different from those encountered in fixed networks, due to increased node vulnerability and the nature of the wireless medium. Hence, anonymity in MANETs requires rethinking. In this work, we examine it anew.

Outline of the paper: Section 2 presents the related work done. Section 3 gives an overview of the proposed privacy preserving unconditionally secure message authentication scheme (PPMAS). Section 4 discusses security analysis. Performance analysis is given in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and suggests possible extensions.

2 Related Work

2.1 Terminology and preliminary
Unlinkability of an entity with a message or an action performed by it means that an adversary with enough information is unable to identify the identity of the entity, given the message or an action performed by it. Unlinkability makes anonymity possible. Privacy of both the source and the destination has to be protected in MANETs. It is also desirable that the attacker should not be able to derive the fact that source and destination nodes are communicating. We define a set of objects called anonymous set (AS) to see that a particular object is unidentifiable.

Our proposed work, like any other signature schemes consists of two algorithms, GEN and VER. With GEN algorithm, given the message m and the public keys of anonymous set (AS), a sender from AS, with her own private key, can generate an anonymous message s(m). The VER algorithm, given the message m and anonymous message s(m), is used to verify whether s(m) is generated by a member in the AS. The security requirements for our method are sender anonymity and Unforgeability.

2.2 A discussion on existing works
The existing anonymous communication protocols are largely stemmed from either mixnet [2] or DC-net [4]. The secrecy of user’s communication relationship can be protected by using mixnet. Anonymity can be provided by packet reshuffling through at least one trusted “mix”. The outgoing message and the ID of the recipient are encrypted by the sender using the public key of the “mix”. A batch of encrypted messages will be accumulated at the mix, it then decrypts and reorders those messages and forwards them to recipients. Therefore an eavesdropper is unable to link a decrypted output message with any particular encrypted input message. Recently, Moler presented a secure public-key encryption algorithm for mixnet [10]. This algorithm has been adopted by Mixminion [9]. However, since mixnet like protocols rely on the statistical properties of background traffic, they cannot provide provable anonymity.
Crowds [13] extends the idea of anonymizer and is designed for anonymous web browsing. However, Crowds only provides sender anonymity. Packet content and receivers would not be hidden by the en route nodes. Hordes [11] builds on the Crowds. It
provides only sender anonymity and uses multicast services.

DC-net [4, 6] is an anonymous multiparty computation amongst a set of participants, some pairs of which share secret keys. Without the need of trusted servers DC-net provides perfect sender anonymity. In order to achieve receiver anonymity users have to send encrypted broadcasts to the entire group. However, DC-net gives different level of sender-receiver anonymity, because all group members get aware of when a message is sent. In addition, DC-net takes additional band width to handle collisions and contention, as only one user could send at a time. Finally, when a DC-net participant is joining the system, it fixes DC-net’s tradeoff between anonymity and band width, but when others are joining there are no provisions to rescale.

Recently, message sender anonymity based on ring signatures was introduced [7] and [12]. This method provides an assurance to the sender that the generated message has source anonymous signature along with content authenticity, while hiding the message sender’s real identity. The major idea is that the message sender (say Alice) randomly selects \( n \) of ring members as the AS on her own without awareness of these members.

To generate a ring signature, for each member in the ring other than the actual sender (Alice), Alice randomly selects an input and computes the one-way output using message signature forgery. To perform trapdoor one-way function, the actual sender Alice, using her knowledge of the trap-door information, tries to solve the “message” that can “glue” the ring together, and then signs this “message”. The original scheme has very limited flexibility and the complexity of the scheme is quite high. Moreover, the Original paper only focuses on the cryptographic algorithm, the relevant network issues were totally left unaddressed.

In this paper, we propose an unconditionally secure privacy preserving unconditionally secure message authentication scheme (PPMAS). The main idea is that for each message \( m \) to be released, the sending node generates a privacy preserving message authentication for the message \( m \). The generation is based on the MNES scheme discussed in 3.1. Unlike ring signatures, which require computing a forgery signature for each member in the AS separately, our scheme only requires three steps to generate the entire PPMAS. This scheme links all non-senders and the message sender to the PPMAS alike. In addition, our design enables the PPMAS to be verified through a single equation without verifying the signatures individually.

3 Our Work

In this section, we propose an efficient privacy preserving unconditionally secure message authentication scheme (PPMAS). The main idea is that for each message \( m \) to be released, the sending node generates a privacy preserving message authentication for the message \( m \). The generation is based on the MNES scheme discussed in 3.1. Unlike ring signatures, which require computing a forgery signature for each member in the AS separately, our scheme only requires three steps to generate the entire PPMAS. This scheme links all non-senders and the message sender to the PPMAS alike. In addition, our design enables the PPMAS to be verified through a single equation without verifying the signatures individually.

3.1 Modified New variant ElGamal Signature scheme (MNES) Algorithm

The NES [3] is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms and is based on schemes originally presented by ElGamal [1] and Schnorr [18]. Even though it relies on an ElGamal similar equation with three unknown variables, it has the following advantages.

- It avoids the extended Euclidean algorithm
- Sender can sign two messages with the same couple of secret exponents.

Based on the NES [3], we propose a modified new variant ElGamal signature (MNES) algorithm. To generate a signature and to verify it for a message \( m \), using Modified New variant Signature scheme(MNES).

![Fig.1. Algorithms used for MNES](image)

Algorithms used for MNES are defined as follows:

1) KEY_GEN algorithm

- Global public key components
  - \( p \): a large prime
  - \( a \): generator of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \)
User’s private key
- \( x \): a random number, \( x \in Z_p^* \)

User’s public key
- \( y = \alpha^x \mod p \)

User’s secret exponents
- \( k, l \): random numbers, \( k, l \in Z_{p-1}^* \)

2) SIG_GEN algorithm

\[
r = \alpha^k \mod p \\
s = \alpha^l \mod p \\
qu = \alpha^h \mod p \quad \text{where } h = h(m, rs) \\
w = k + l + q + xr + ks + lq \mod (p - 1).
\]

Signature = (r, s, w).
where r, s are signature components, k and l are secret exponents and w is a verification parameter.

3) VER algorithm

The verifier checks the signature equation

\[
a^w = rsqy^tr^s \mod p.
\]

If the equality (1) holds true, then the verifier accepts the signature and rejects otherwise.

The generation and verification of MNES is diagrammatically represented in Fig.1.

### 3.2 Unconditionally secure PPMAS

Suppose that the message sender (say Alice) wishes to transmit a message \( m \) anonymously from her network node to any other node. The AS includes \( n \) members, \( A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n \), for example, \( s = \{A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n\} \), where the actual message sender Alice is \( A_t \), for some value \( t \), \( 1 \leq t \leq n \).

Let \( p \) be a large prime number and \( \alpha \) be a primitive element of \( Z_p^* \). Then \( \alpha \) is also a generator of \( Z_p^* \). That is \( Z_p^* = \langle \alpha \rangle \). Both \( p \) and \( \alpha \) are made public and shared by all members in \( s \). Each \( A_i \in s \) has a public key \( y_i = \alpha^{x_i} \mod p \), where \( x_i \) is a randomly selected private key from \( Z_{p-1}^* \). In this paper, we will not distinguish between the code \( A_i \) and its public key \( y_i \). Therefore, we also have \( s = \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n\} \).

Suppose \( m \) is a message to be transmitted. The private key of the message sender Alice is \( x_t \), \( 1 \leq t \leq n \). To generate an efficient PPMAC for message \( m \), Alice performs the following two algorithms:

1. **SIG_GEN algorithm for PPMAS**:

   - Compute \( r_i = \alpha^{k_i} \mod p \), \( s_i = \alpha^{l_i} \mod p \), \( q_i = \alpha^{h_i} \mod p \) for each \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), \( i \neq t \), where \( k_i \), \( l_i \) are random and pair wise different numbers in \( Z_{p-1}^* \), and \( h_i = H(m, r_is_i) \). \( h \) is a hash function like SHA-1.

   - Compute \( r_t = \alpha^{k} \prod_{i \neq t} r_i^{-x_i} \mod p \), \( s_t = \alpha^{l} \prod_{i \neq t} s_i^{-x_i} \mod p \), \( q_t = \alpha^{h} \prod_{i \neq t} s_i^{-q_i} \mod p \) for a random \( k, l \).
\[ h = H(m, rs), \text{ such that } r_t \neq 1, \]
\[ s_t \neq 1, h_t \neq 1, r_i \neq r_t, s_i \neq s_t, h_i \neq h_t \text{ for each } i \neq t. \]

- Compute
\[ w = k + l + h + \sum_{i=t}^q k_i + \sum_{i=t}^q l_i + \sum_{i=t}^q h_i + x_t r_t + k_t s_t + l_t q_t \mod (p - 1) \]

Then the signature is
\[ s(m) = (m, s, r_1, ..., r_n, s_1, ..., s_n, q_1, ..., q_n, w, ...). \]
Where
\[ \alpha^w = (r_1 ... r_n s_1 ... s_n q_1 ... q_n y_1 ... y_n) \mod p. \]

2. **VER algorithm**

The verifier verifies
\[ \alpha^w = r_1 ... r_n s_1 ... s_n q_1 ... q_n y_1 ... y_n \]
\[ \sum_{i=1}^n s_i \mod p. \]

If (2) holds true, the verifier accepts the PPMAS as valid for message \( m \). Otherwise the verifier rejects the PPMAS.

If the PPMAS has been correctly generated, then we have
\[ \Pi_{i=1}^n r_i \Pi_{i=1}^n s_i \Pi_{i=1}^n q_i \Pi_{i=1}^n y_i \Pi_{i=1}^n r_i \]
\[ = (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n r_i) r_t (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n s_i) s_t (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n q_i) q_t (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n y_i) \]
\[ y_t r_t (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n r_i s_i) r_t (\Pi_{i \neq t}^n s_i q_i) q_t s_t \mod p. \]

Therefore PPMAS should always be accepted if it is correctly generated without being modified. As a trade-off between computation and communication, the PPMAS can also be defined as
\[ s(m) = (m, s, r_1, ..., r_n, s_1, ..., s_n, w). \] If \( s \) is also clear, it can be eliminated from the PPMAS. The generation and verification of PPMAS (Privacy preserving message authentication scheme) is diagrammatically represented in Fig.2.

3.3 **Node mobility**

As far as the group is formed and maintaining without any disturbances, everything is well and good. Because of the dynamic nature of MANET nodes, a node may join or leave the group whenever it is willing to. This will be handled by a specially designated node in the group called special node.

3.3.1 **New node joining the group**

Whenever a new node, say \( A \), wants to join in the group, it sends a request to special node. Depending on the signal strength received, the special node fixes the position of new node in the group. This information is broadcasted to all other nodes in the group by the special node.

3.3.2 **Existing node leaving the group**

Whenever an existing node in the group say \( A \), wants to leave the group, it sends leaving message to its neighbours as well as the special node. The special node broadcasts this information also to the group members.

Therefore, whenever a node wants to generate an anonymous message \( s(m) \), it considers received broadcast messages from the special node, regarding new node joining and existing node leaving. To generate an anonymous message, it requires public keys of all existing nodes in the ring. This information is required by the sending node to collect the public keys of the group members, which are required to generate \( s(m) \). But, the topology changes regarding the dynamic nature of MANET nodes will not affect the anonymous message generation by a node in the group.
3.4 Integration with Mobile Ad Hoc Routing Protocols

3.4.1 Architecture of the network topology of our Work

Our proposed PPMAS may use the topology shown in Fig.3. Prior to the network deployment, the network administrator categorizes the ring nodes into ordinary nodes and special nodes, as indicated in the Fig.2. Inter MANET node communication is possible through special nodes. Statically or dynamically generated pseudonyms can be assigned to special nodes to provide anonymous transmissions as in [7], [24], [26].

4. Security analysis

In this subsection, we prove that the proposed PPMAS is unconditionally anonymous and provably unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack: an adversary who receives signatures for messages of his choice cannot later forge the signature of even a single additional message.
4.1 Anonymity

To prove that the proposed PPMAS is unconditionally anonymous, we have to prove that
- For anybody other than the members of $\mathcal{S}$ the probability to successfully identify the real sender is $1/n$.
- Anybody from $\mathcal{S}$ can generate PPMAS.

**Axiom 1.** The proposed privacy preserving message authentication scheme (PPMAS) can provide unconditional message sender anonymity.

**Proof.** The identity of the message sender is unconditionally protected with the proposed PPMAS scheme. This is because that regardless of the sender’s identity, there are exactly $(p - 1)(p - 2) \cdots (p - n)$ different options to generate the PPMAS, and all of them can be chosen by the PPMAS generation procedure and by any of the members in the AS with equal probability without depending on any complexity theoretic assumptions. The proof for the second part, that anybody from $\mathcal{S}$ can generate the PPMAS is straightforward.

4.2 Unforgeability

The design of the proposed PPMAS relies on the ElGamal signature scheme. Different levels of security can be achieved by signature schemes. The maximum level of security is a counter to existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack. In order to discuss counter measure to chosen message attack for PPMAS, we proved the following theorem. In this connection we define first a verification parameter.

**Definition:** Let $r_i = \alpha^{k_i} \mod p$, $s_i = \alpha^{l_i} \mod p$, $q_i = \alpha^{h_i} \mod p$, $r_t = \alpha^{h_t} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} y_i^{-r_i} \mod p$, $s_t = \alpha^{h_t} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} r_i^{-s_i} \mod p$, $q_t = \alpha^{h_t} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} q_i^{-q_i} \mod p$. We define verification parameter $w$ such that $w = k + l + h + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} k_i + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} l_i + x_t r_t + k_t s_t + l_t q_t \mod (p - 1)$.

**Axiom 2.** A sender can sign two messages with same pair of secret exponents.

**Proof.** Consider a MANET with $n$ nodes $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n$. Let a node $A_t$, where $1 \leq t \leq n$ be the actual sender. Let $m_1$ and $m_2$ be two different messages with different verification parameters $w_1$ and $w_2$ respectively. For these two different messages, we assume that they have same couple of secret exponents $k_t$ and $l_t$ where $1 \leq i \leq n$. We know that $r_i = \alpha^{k_i} \mod p$, $s_i = \alpha^{l_i} \mod p$ which follows that $r_t, s_t$’s are same for the two messages $m_1$ and $m_2$. Now we can take the signatures of two messages $m_1$ and $m_2$ as $(r_1, \ldots, r_n, s_1, \ldots, s_n, w_1)$ and $(r_1, \ldots, r_n, s_1, \ldots, s_n, w_2)$ respectively. By the definition of verification parameter, we have

\[
w_1 \equiv k_t + l_t + h_t + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} k_i + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} l_i + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} h_i + x_t r_t + k_t s_t + l_t q_t \mod (p - 1)
\]

\[
w_2 \equiv k_t + l_t + h_t + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} k_i + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} l_i + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} h_i + x_t r_t + k_t s_t + l_t q_t \mod (p - 1)
\]

For some large prime $p$ and $x_t$ is the private key of $A_t$. Where $h_t = h(m_1, r_t, s_t)$, $q_t = \alpha^{h_t} \mod p$, $h_t' = h(m_2, r_t, s_t)$, $q_t' = \alpha^{h_t} \mod p$, $h$ is a hash function like SHA-1.

Then, $w_1 - w_2 \equiv h_t - h_t' + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} (h_t - h_t') + l_t (q_t - q_t') \mod (p - 1)$

\[
w_1 - w_2 \equiv l_t (q_t - q_t') \mod (p - 1)
\]

\[
w_1 - w_2 = l_t (q_t - q_t') + L (p - 1)
\]

Let $gcd(q_t - q_t', p - 1) = d$

\[
q_t - q_t' = dQ
\]

$p - 1 = dP \quad \text{Where } P, Q \in Z_p; \quad gcd(P, Q) = 1$

\[
w_1 - w_2 = l_t dQ + LdP \quad \text{mod } P
\]

\[
w_1 - w_2 = d(l_t Q + LP) \quad \text{mod } P
\]

\[
w_1 - w_2 = dM \quad \text{mod } P \quad \text{where } M = l_t Q + LP
\]

\[
\Rightarrow M = l_t Q \quad \text{mod } P
\]

\[
\Rightarrow l_t = MQ^{-1} \quad \text{mod } P
\]

\[
\text{[\because gcd(P, Q) = 1, Q is invertible with respect to P]}
\]
Without the loss of generality, we can assume that $L' = L$.

\[ l_t = MQ^{-1} + LP \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Now $l_t < p - 1$ as we know that $s_t = \alpha^t \prod_{i \neq t} r_i^{-s_i} \mod p$

\[ \Rightarrow l_t < p \]
\[ \Rightarrow l_t < dP + 1 \]
\[ \Rightarrow l_t \leq dP \]
\[ \Rightarrow MQ^{-1} + LP \leq dP \]
\[ \Rightarrow MQ^{-1} \leq P(d - L) \]

This is possible if $d - L > 0$, $\Rightarrow L < d$

Now by (3), we can test every value of $L$ and check with $s_t = \alpha^t \prod_{i \neq t} r_i^{-s_i} \mod p$. Even though we can find $l_t$, it is very difficult to find out $k_t$ and $x_t$, which leads the theorem.

4.2.1 PPMAS is unforgeable

In connection with the above theorem, one may infer that, the proposed PPMAS is unforgeable. With two different messages $m_1$ and $m_2$ having different verification parameters $w_1$ and $w_2$, same $k_t$, $l_t$ (secret exponents) and $x_t$ (private key), an attacker can identify one of the secret exponents $l_t$. But it is computationally infeasible for him to deduce $k_t$ and $x_t$ using the known $l_t$. Therefore our proposed PPMAS is secure enough against existential forgery attack. Hence PPMAS is unforgeable.

4.3 Integration with privacy preserving communication protocols

PPMAS is used to provide only sender anonymity, when a sending node is in a group i.e., in a ring topology or in a coalition. To achieve full anonymity using PPMAS, one has to transmit the source anonymous message using a privacy preserving communication protocol like the one in [7].

5 Performance Analysis

The execution of PPMAS system grows with an increase in the number of nodes in the $O(n^2)$, where $n$ is the number of nodes. If we take number of nodes in the group on x-axis and time in seconds on y-axis, the resultant graph which shows the performance of PPMAS is as shown in Fig.1. It is clearly observable that when the number of nodes increases consistently, the time take for the nodes to generate PPMAS will increase accordingly.

5 Conclusions

The paper has proposed an unconditionally secure privacy preserving message authentication scheme using another newly proposed modified new variant ElGamal signature scheme. The anonymity and Unforgeability properties of this scheme were proved. A critical security analysis of said scheme was performed. It was observed that the link between identifier of a node and its location is hidden. Another advantages of this scheme is that the trusted third parties are not required and more than one message is signed with the same signature. This scheme can be used with any wireless adhoc networks with ring topology. This paper proposes a method to anonymize source, but when implemented with appropriate routing protocol, full anonymity (source anonymity, relationship anonymity and destination anonymity) can be achieved.
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